

## Mainly based on:


## EUBOF (2021) Central Bank Digital Currencies and a Euro for the Future





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## **Global landscape of CBDCs**



Source: Reuters research, Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center & Atlantic Council

### THE GLOBAL CBDC COMPETITIVE LANDSCAPE

	Development Progress of Global Official Digital Currency
China	Trials of DCEP have been carried out in various regions.
US	Still in development; the Boston Fed is working with researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to develop and test a hypothetical digital currency for central banks.
UK	In March 2020, the Bank of England published a discussion paper – "Central Bank Digital Currency: Opportunities, Challenges, and Design". It has designed a model and is seeking opinions from payment industry and academia.
Europe	On September 29, 2020, the European Central Bank (ECB) released a 50-page report, claiming that it would consider the issuance of digital euro; on October 12, the ECB started seeking public opinions. By mid-2021, it will decide whether to introduce a digital euro.
Canada	In February 2020, the Bank of Canada unveiled its plan on CBDC. The document listed out the public policy considerations, possible risks, and high-level strategies.
Russia	On October 13, 2020, the Bank of Russia released a consultation paper called "A Digital Ruble". It outlines potential ways to implement the roll-out of a digital ruble and the corresponding functional requirements.
Japan	On October 9, 2020, Japan published a document – "The Bank of Japan's Approach to CBDC", saying it would conduct the experiment in three phases. In the first two phases, the bank will develop a test environment for the CBDC system and implement functions of CBDC in the test environment; in the phase III, the bank will consider a pilot program. The Bank of Japan aims to start the phase I in early fiscal year 2021.
South Korea	It plans to start pilot programs in early 2021 and complete preliminary technical design and evaluation of CBDC in the summer of 2021.

Graphic@Asia Briefing Ltd.

## **CBDC – Central Bank Digital Currencies**

A form of digital money issued by a central bank


Almost **90%** of the world's central banks are engaged in **studying**, **developing** or **using** the potential of central bank-issued digital currency (it was 30% in 2018)

40% are making prototypes

16% are conducting pilot studies

The **PBOC** (People's Bank of China) will issue the digital *Renminbi* (Yuan - RMB) in the **spring 2022** 

RMB 2 billion (US \$ 299.07 million) was spent using digital *yuan* in four million transactions in China



Current payment infr.

# Current payment infrastructure in the Euro zone

1999 - Introduction of the Euro

2002 - Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement Express Transfer System for Europe (TARGET)

### 2007 - **TARGET2**

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- support the implementation of the Eurosystem's monetary policy and the functioning of the euro money market
- minimise systemic risk in the payments market
- increase the efficiency of cross-border payments in euro
- maintain the integration and stability of the Eurozone money market

Fano, 9-11 febbraio 2022

2018 - TARGET Instant Payment Settlement, or TIPS

to address the growing consumer demand for **instant payments** without reintroducing the complexity and fragmentation of national solutions

The common denominator of each **new advancement** is the promise of further **speed** and **efficiency** in payments, costs **savings**, **pan-European** coverage, and additional features to address the modern needs of consumers and the Central Bank.

A European CBDC (or digital Euro) would be the next step in this process

## CBDC: a form of digital money issued by a central bank

... not an entirely novel concept.

Commercial banks hold a minimum amount of cash, as well as deposits with the central bank in the form of reserves (fractional model of the bank)

These reserve accounts fulfil the definition of a CBDC presented above, as they are digital representations of value, recorded as a liability of the central bank and an asset for the commercial bank.

### The novelty of CBDCs and the digital Euro:

digital liability of the central bank available to the private sector

## In terms of CBDC availability, there are two models:

#### Wholesale CBDCs

pertain to the expansion of the fractional model described above to include other legal entities besides commercial banks, whether those are financial institutions or otherwise.

### **Retail CBDCs**

to fulfil the necessary functions of money, serving as a *medium of exchange*, *store of value*, and *unit of account*, for individuals, households and businesses.

## Rationale behind issuing a CBDC

- 1. Payment efficiency and security
- 2. Inclusion
- 3. Financial sovereignty
- 4. Future proofing of economies

### 1. Payment efficiency and security

### Cash remains the preferred medium for exchanges today:

**73**% of Point-of-sale (POS) transactions **48**% of the total value of POS payments (down from 78% and 53% 2017).

cash ➡ tangible nature, speed, lack of fees, instant transfer of value convenient for retailers local payments


#### **However**

**International and non-cash payments have grown significantly**, following the exponential rise of ecommerce.

From 2018 to 2019, the aggregate number of electronic payments in the euro area increased by 8%, to a total of approximately €100 billion, with a total value of more than €160 trillion.

### Payment efficiency and security

# What will be the most common form of payment in 2030?



- Mobile payments through devices and wearables
- Biometrics facial recognition, fingerprinting, retinal scanning
- Crypto payments
- Cards

The future of payments (source EUBOF 2021)

Expanding services previously reserved for the commercial banking system to the wider **private sector** would need **resilience and efficiency** of the payments system

by

- improved Real Time Gross Settlement System RTGS/TIPS
- new Distributed Ledger Technologies DLT

A CBDC tied to real-life identities could prevent

money laundering and terrorist financing.

Level of **pseudonymity/anonymity** adjusted according to the central bank

### 2. Inclusion

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While cash is gradually phased out, commercial banks might find it fruitless to expand their services to financially excluded groups, such as the

### unbanked.

A CBDC could address the consequences of the declining use of cash extending financial services to the

**1.7 billion unbanked** of the world **26% in Europe** (2016)

To achieve this, some minimum infrastructure would be required: **Internet, computers and/or smartphones.** 

## 3. Financial sovereignty

Central banks face two distinct types of risks for their financial sovereignty:

- monetary policy inefficiencies
- rising competition from alternatives developed in the private sector

Central banks use unconventional methods (negative interest rates and quantitative easing) to drive monetary policy.

A CBDC could add

### new weapons to the arsenal of a central bank

to facilitate monetary policy and address future crises.

# Competitors of the central bank in the monopoly of money creation:

- Bitcoin and stablecoins
- Privately-issued digital assets, such as Facebook's Diem (Libra)
- Competing CBDC deployments by other central banks

## 4. Future proofing of economies

CBDC could also accommodate for trends that will define the future of payments and finance.

**Programmable money** (*smart contracts*) could allow a CBDC to operate according to **complex conditions and rules**.


so as to create

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novel features that cannot be implemented otherwise.

### Interoperability with other digital systems

can allow for the convergence between the *Internet of Things* and value systems, enabling new forms of commerce, such as machine-to-machine (M2M).



This diagram is not enough informative to capture the effect of new technologies disrupting the bank sector.

"Fintech's ability to merge social media, use data smartly and integrate with other platforms rapidly (often without the disadvantages of being an actual bank) will help these companies win significant market share"

(J. Dimon, CEO JP. Morgan Chase & Co., 2020)

Better is to use the **Gartner Magic Quadrant** (or similar two-axis scatter plots) in assessing emerging markets, particularly for assessing disruption and opportunity


# Example of a Gartner Magic Quadrant for meeting solutions



source Gartner (October 2020)

The global CBDC landscape

Gartner Magic Quadrant for currencies



source EUBOF 2021 A key aspect of this competitive landscape is to recognize that there are two distinct types of players:

- 1. Institutional players (Central Banks, IMF, BIS, World Bank, G7, G20, ...)
- 2. the uninvited guests, that is non-sovereign actors

Example of uninvited guests (non-sovereign actors):

- Bitcoin and its ecosystem
- Ethereum and the smart contracts
- Stablecoins

## Bitcoin and its ecosystem

It already exists and has operated for over a decade

It has an easily recognizable brand; already used by hundreds of millions of people

It has a vibrant ecosystem of service providers

It has a large "total addressable market"

Algorithmic (and capped) inflation schedule

### **Censorship resistance**

Perceived as a store of value and an hedge to inflation

Legal tender in San Salvador: Panama, Paraguay and Guatemala next in 2022

It could appeal to users who are wary of the motives in introducing CBDCs, (economic surveillance)

### Main Bitcoin's drawbacks:

- Its throughput is extremely limited (scalability)
- Energy consumption (and environmental impact) of its consensus mechanism, based on the PoW
- Vulnerable to severe deleveraging during a crisis, due to fixed inflation schedule

## Ethereum and the smart contracts

Ethereum begins where Bitcoin ends:

- Turing-complete language (Solidity)
- Smart-contracts
- De-Fi, DEX, NFT, etc.

### Main Ethereum's drawbacks:

- Halting problem, Rice theorem
- Bitcoin evolves slowly but surely, Ethereum changes rapidly and sometimes it is not clear to users whether the changes are positive.
- Too much centralization and governance power under a single person (Vitalik Buterin)
- Weight of a full node (7TB of space, 400 GB for Bitcoin)
- Path from PoW to PoS risky

## **Stablecoins**

Stablecoins are cryptocurrencies tied to a fiat currency, such as the dollar, euro, or a basket of currencies.

Almost 60 projects as today

**USDT, USDC, BUSD, UST, DAI, TUSD, USDP**, .... are examples of stablecoins pegged to US \$


**UST** is an algorithmic stablecoin

JPM coin (JP Morgan Chase)

**DIEM** (ex-Libra), the next stablecoin of Facebook, accused by the US Congress to threaten financial stability of the FED

The global CBDC landscape

**Gartner Magic Quadrant for** (crypto-)currencies



### A Framework for action

Central banks must maintain their core user base against:

- other central banks' efforts to expand their influence globally
- non-sovereign actors

The **exponential growth of alternative currencies** and the **relentless innovation**, tie-ins to social media, and efforts to form alliances among less-established players


## pose a serious threaten

to Central Banks soverignty.

## A case study: Minitel



Minitel 1. Built 1982



1985 TELIC-1 Alcatel Minitel terminal

## A case study: Minitel

Minitel was the *France Telecom*'s offering for the nascent *e*-commerce space.

Backed by the federal government

9 million terminals, used by 25 million people, 26000 different services available

Efforts to expand internationally

At the time Internet was nothing more than an overgrown academic experiment, with no security, no official backing, and skepticism from the business community.

And yet the Internet's uncoordinated, decentralized growth rapidly dwarfed the Minitel effort, first overseas, and then within France itself.

Its last users were a group of dairy farmers who lacked access to broadband in remote areas of the country.

So, **competition** to any single national CBDC could come from **other fiat currencies** or from **non-sovereign actors**, who end up evolving more useful features or **create dominating network effects** accelerated by strategic alliances, all at **exponential rates** that **shrink the timeframe for appropriate response**.

## что делать?


First: do no harm!

The stability of the financial system within the EU is paramount

Second: raise concern, without being alarmist

The race for the upper right quadrant of the Gartner Magic Quadrant is well underway.

## Google search interest over time<sup>2</sup>



source BIS 880 (2020)

### THE DIGITAL EURO TIMELINE



Figure 6 Digital euro timeline. Source: (EUBOF)

## The Digital Euro Design Space

## **Core principles**

as fundamental requirements for a digital Euro

- 1. be convertible at par with the regular Euro
- 2. controlled by the Eurosystem
- 3. be available on equal terms in countries of the Eurozone
- 4. market neutrality: not to rule out private solutions
- 5. it must remain a **trusted** solution by end-consumers

## **Scenario-Specific Requirements**


- a. support of digitalization
- b. address the declining use of cash
- c. combat the risks of private money creation
- d. expand the monetary toolbox
- e. improve payment system resilience
- f. strengthen the relevance and international utility of the euro
- g. facilitate cost efficiency, and environmental sustainability

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## **General requirements**

- 1. the ability to control the amount of digital euro in circulation
- 2. the need to **coexist** (cooperate) with other market participants
- 3. to comply with regulatory standards
- 4. the requirement of safety and efficiency in the fulfilment of the Eurosystem's goals
- its accessibility throughout the euro area through standardized and interoperable solutions
- use outside of the euro area
- 7. cyber resilience





The CBDC pyramid maps consumer needs (left-hand side) onto the associated design choices for the central bank (right-hand side). The four layers of the right-hand side form a hierarchy in which the lower layers represent design choices that feed into subsequent, higher-level decisions.


Auer and Böhme 2020

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## **DESIGN OPTIONS**

- 1. **Architecture** (Management) the nature of claims of a CBDC and the corresponding role of the central bank (centralist vs federalist);
- Infrastructure conventional (RTGS/TIPS) vs DLT infrastructure;
- Access Technology (Evidence of ownership) account-based vs token-based
- Interlinkages wholesale vs retail use.

## **CBDC** Design Space



# E-own or evidence of ownership


## Account-based vs Token-based

Most relevant literature utilises the terms "Proof of Ownership", "Proof of Access" and similar patterns to describe this dichotomy of account-based versus token-based infrastructures.

The digital Euro design space

**Account-based approach** 


I am, therefore I own



Digital tokens: "I know, therefore I own"

# **Token-based approach**

I know, therefore I own



# **Account-based approach**

#### **Pros**

- simplicity, proven reliability, and interoperability with the existing payment systems
- it may facilitate a smooth and cost-effective transition to a digital euro, as commercial and central banks already operate on an account-based system

#### Cons

- no financial inclusion
- no privacy

# **Token-based approach**

## Pros

- privacy, accessibility and relative cash-likeness
- financial inclusion

## Cons

• KYC, AML requirements

# Account-based vs Token-based

Philosophy in the crypto world: Code is law

Philosophy in the ECB: Law is law

... as to say that transactions as a result of unauthorized access, fraud, or technical malfunctions, open to dispute in court or otherwise.

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# **Ledger Infrastructure**

# RTGS/TIPS vs Blockchain/DLT

RTGS - Europe's Real Time Gross Settlement System, or TIPS (TARGET Instant Payment Settlement)

DLT - Distributed Ledger Technologies

The digital Euro design space

## **Pros**

# **RTGS/TIPS**


- Proven a safe, stable, scalable, and user-accepted real-time 24/7/365 payments system
- Almost instant transactions, 99 per cent settling in under 5 seconds, 40 million payments/day, 500 trans/sec up to 2000
- Employing existing technologies and infrastructures comes with a plethora of benefits

#### Cons


- Strictly limited to institutions participating in its network
- It lacks interoperable bridges with solutions deployed in the open blockchain space
- A token-based scenario may necessitate modifications to TIPS to accommodate for the differences in data structures.

# **Blockchain/DLT**

#### Elements of Blockchain



#### Blockchain Technology Stack



Source: Arun Devan

# **Blockchain/DLT**

## Permissioned vs permissionless

Permissioned systems reserve participation for appointed, vetted and known entities

They operate in comparably less adversary environments

They can rely on the accountability of their nodes for the validity of information; the scheme is known as **Proof of Authority (PoA)**.

PoA systems rely on a <u>small set of trusted and reputable entities</u> to act as transaction validators and update the ledger.

In the case of a European CBDC the list of validators can be adjusted to include the Central Bank, national banks of European Member States, commercial banks and even other stakeholders from the private sector.

# **Blockchain/DLT**

PoA blockchains abolish decentralised features as

transparency, openness and immutability

in favour of

efficiency, speed, scalability, flexibility, control, and



## Pros

# **Blockchain/DLT**

- PoA DLT/blockchain system would facilitate the adoption of either account/based or token-based
- Make interoperability with other blockchain deployments easier, due to a similar structure.
- Code and app developed for the open blockchain could run natively in a digital euro, thus achieving programmability of money.
- PoA blockchains need not costly consensus algorithms to verify transactions

#### Cons

- Overhead costs of its deployment
- Non-interoperability with existing RTGS/TIPS payment infrastructure

# **Management Scheme**

## Centralist vs Federalist


## **Centralist**:

**ECB responsible** for managing accounts, **KYC/AML**, and the critical components of the technology stack, including holding accounts or token metadata of end-users, and for updating TIPS or blockchain ledger.

## **Federalist**

retails hold accounts with commercial banks and other depository institutions. Accounts are backed 1:1 with digital euro held by commercial banks at the Central Bank.


# **Centralist/Direct model**



## Cons

- ECB would have to expand its operations substantially to accommodate its new responsibilities and develop the necessary expertise to manage retail customer relationships (KYC/AML)
- <u>Disintermediation</u> of commercial banks

# Federalist/Indirect



#### **Pros**

**PRIN 2020** 

 Minimal disruption of established banking sector, which remains responsible for acquiring and onboarding customers (KYC, AML)

# **Digital Euro Design Options**

## Infrastructure:

- RTGS/TIPS
- DLT/Blockchain


## Management:

- Centralist
- Federalist

## E-Own:

- Account-based
- Token-based

## **CBDC** Design Space



## **Digital Euro Design Options**

ARC Account-Based RTGS/TIPS Centralist Digital Euro

ARF Account-Based RTGS/TIPS Federalist Digital Euro

ADC Account-Based **DLT**/Blockchain **C**entralist Digital Euro

**ADF** Account-Based **DLT**/Blockchain **F**ederalist Digital Euro

TRC Token-Based RTGS/TIPS Centralist Digital Euro


**TRF** Token-Based RTGS/TIPS Federalist Digital Euro

TDC Token-Based **DLT**/Blockchain **C**entralist Digital Euro

**TDF** Token-Based **DLT**/Blockchain **F**ederalist Digital Euro Account-Based RTGS/TIPS Centralist Digital Euro

**ARC** 


 All transactions handled by debiting and crediting accounts held with the Central Bank



Account-Based RTGS/TIPS Federalist Digital Euro

**ARF** 


• Closest resemblance to existing systems and procedures



Account-Based
DLT/Blockchain
Centralist Digital Euro

**ADC** 


 Use of DLT redundant in a Centralist system



Account-Based
DLT/Blockchain
Federalist Digital Euro

**ADF** 


 ECB, commercial banks, and other payment serving as the trusted nodes in a PoA blockchain



Token-Based RTGS/TIPS Centralist Digital Euro

**TRC** 


• ECB responsible for maintaining the only mempool and chainstate



Token-Based RTGS/TIPS Federalist Digital Euro

**TRF** 


uses a token/UTXO model in conjunction with TIPS



Token-Based
DLT/Blockchain
Centralist Digital Euro

**TDC** 


- Closely resembling a permissioned Bitcoin deployment with the ECB acting as the sole validator.
- Use of DLT redundant in a Centralist system



Token-Based
DLT/Blockchain
Federalist Digital Euro

**TDF** 

- Closest to the open blockchain sector
- Closely resembling a permissioned Bitcoin system.
- ECB, commercial banks, and other PSPs would work collaboratively in a PoA system to maintain a blockchain ledger of transactions.



Prerequisite/	Core requirements satisfied according to CDBC type:										
Requirement	ARC Euro	ARF Euro	ADC Euro	ADF Euro	TRC Euro	TRF Euro	TDC Euro	TDF Euro			
Convertibility at par	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			
Liability of the Eurosystem	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			
European solution	Possibly	Yes	Possibly	Yes	Possibly	Yes	Possibly	Yes			
Market neutrality	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes			
Trust	Possibly	Yes	Possibly	Yes	Possibly	Yes	Possibly	Yes			

Prerequisite/	Scenario-specific requirements satisfied according to CDBC type:								
Requirement	ARC Euro	ARF Euro	ADC Euro	ADF Euro	TRC Euro	TRF Euro	TDC Euro	TDF Euro	
Enhanced digital efficiency	Possibly	Yes	Possibly	Yes	Possibly	Yes	Possibly	Yes	
Cash-like features	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	
Competitive features	Possibly	Possibly	Yes	Yes	Possibly	Possibly	Yes	Yes	
Monetary policy option	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Back-up system	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
International use	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Cost saving	Possibly	Yes	No	Possibly	Possibly	Yes	No	Possibly	
Environment friendly	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	

Prerequisite/		General requirements satisfied according to CDBC type:								
Requirement	ARC Euro	ARF Euro	ADC Euro	ADF Euro	TRC Euro	TRF Euro	TDC Euro	TDF Euro		
Control money in circulation	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Cooperation with market participants	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes		
Compliance with regulation	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly		
Safety and Efficiency for European goals	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Accessibility throughout the euro area	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly		
Use by non-EU area residents	yes	yes	yes	yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Cyber Resilience	yes	yes	yes	yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		

# **Final assessment**

NiRvAna is focused on this

	Total 'Yes'	Total 'Possibly'	Total 'No'	Total Marks
ARF Euro	16	4	0	18
TRF Euro	16	4	0	18
ADF Euro	16	4	0	18
TDF Euro	16	4	0	18
ARC Euro	10	8	2	14
ADC Euro	11	6	3	14
TRC Euro	10	8	2	14
TDC Euro	11	6	3	14

EUBOF (2021)

## E-Own:

- Account-based
- Token-based

#### Infrastructure:

PTCS/TIPS

DLT/Blockchain

#### Management:

- Centralist
- Federalist

#### Final assessment

-	satis		ist Options ling to CBDC type			Centralist Options satisfied according to CBDC type				
Prerequisite/ Requirement	ARF Euro	TRF Eur		ADF Euro	TDF Euro	ARC Euro	ADC Euro	TRC Euro	TDC Euro	
European solution	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	
Market neutrality	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	
Trust	Yes	Yes	ı	Yes	Yes	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	
Enhanced digital efficiency	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	
Cash-like features	Possibly	Possibly		Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	
Competitive features	Possibly	Possibly		Yes	Yes	Possibly	Yes	Possibly	Yes	
Cost saving	Yes	Yes	I	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	No	Possibly	No	
Cooperation with market participants	Yes	Yes	Ī	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	
Compliance with regulation	Possibly	Possibly		Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	
Accessibility throughout the euro area	Possibly	Possibly		Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	

	Account-based options satisfied according to CBDC type  Token-based options satisfied according to CBDC							
Prerequisite /Requirement	ARF Euro	ADF Euro	ARC Euro	ADC Euro	TRF Euro	TDF Euro	TRC Euro	TDC Euro
Convertibility at par	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Liability of the Eurosystem	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
European solution	Yes	Yes	Possibly	Possibly	Yes	Yes	Possibly	Possibly
Market neutrality	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Trust	Yes	Yes	Possibly	Possibly	Yes	Yes	Possibly	Possibly
Enhanced digital efficiency	Yes	Yes	Possibly	Possibly	Yes	Yes	Possibly	Possibly
Cash-like features	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly
Competitive features	Possibly	Yes	Possibly	Yes	Possibly	Yes	Possibly	Yes
Monetary policy option	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Back-up system	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
International use	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cost saving	Yes	Possibly	Possibly	No	Yes	Possibly	Possibly	No
Environmentally friendly	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control money in circulation	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cooperation with market participants	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Compliance with regulation	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly
Safety & Efficiency for European goals	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Accessibility throughout the euro area	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly	Possibly
Use by non-EU area residents	yes	yes	Yes	yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cyber Resilience	yes	yes	Yes	yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

# Summing up...

- 1. Federalist schemes are more attractive when compared to Centralist schemes
- 2. The design choice between token-based vs account-based systems is not an issue
- 3. Blockchain/DLT is in most cases redundant when trusted parties are involved.

#### however...

- A DLT/Blockchain which supports a programmable environment (smart-contracts), would enable competitive features similar to those of the open blockchain space, but also backed by the protection and guarantees of the Central Bank.
- Moreover, open-source code originally composed for dApp or DeFi
  applications would be natively supported on a digital euro, bootstrapping
  the development of applications.
- Finally, an EVM compatible digital euro, would also benefit from interoperable solutions and standards developed for the open blockchain space.

## INTEROPERABILITY

- The technical ability of two or more disparate systems to exchange information in a manner that maintains the "state and uniqueness" of the information being exchanged.
- There could be a strong preference for the CBDC to be interoperable
  with other systems, whether those are existing payment systems,
  permissioned, or permissionless blockchain-based solutions.

# PROGRAMMABILITY OF MONEY

**Benefits** associated with programmability of digital payments:

- various processes associated with payments can be automated, enabling for more efficient processes;
- 2) they can be **automated** in a **trusted**, **undisputable**, **verifiable manner**, such that the various stakeholders can fully trust and enter into (digital and automated) agreements with other parties.
- 3) This **trust** is built through guarantees **provided by the CBDC** system.

This is exactly what smart contracts on top of DLTs provides, a means to agree to digital processes amongst different parties, without the ability for any party to modify the code that will be automatically executed.

# CBDC Programmability use-cases & Programmability models required

- 1. parameter-only programmability
- 2. domain specific language (DSL) or visualisation programmability
- 3. smart contract-like language

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Scoring: 0 = Low, 10 = High	Parameter-only (template)	Domain Specific Language (DSL) or Visualisation	Smart Contract- like Language
Ease of use	10	5	0
Level of configurability provided to users	0	5	10
Level of support users will require; and likelihood of users making mistakes	0	5	10

# **CBDC** Programmability use-cases examples

## **Automated VAT Settlement**

Trade Finance

Retail-based Delivery Automated Payment Release use-cases

**Notary Services** 

**Automated Payment Schemes** 

**Automated Process Initiation upon Payment** 

**DeFi – Decentralised Finance** 

**Custodianship Services** 

Non-Fungible Tokens and Real-world Assets

## Programmable money could also be used to

- prevent the execution of transactions with sanctioned parties (indicted, condemned, ...)
- automatically report transactions that meet certain regulatory criteria, such as monetary thresholds, association with "dark web" activity, and other red flags

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# TRACEABILITY, COMPLIANCE KYC/AML

The development of a digital euro presents a unique opportunity to address the inherent limitations of the current

**Anti-Money Laundering/Counter-Terrorist Financing (AML/CTF)** framework;

However, **its effectiveness** - along with the required tradeoffs between financial transparency, consumer privacy, and financial inclusion – **will depend on the particular design adopted**.

## IMPLICATIONS OF A DIGITAL EURO FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY

## Risks associated with a CBDC digital Euro

financial disintermediation in calm times

withdrawal of funds from banks and their conversion into CBDC

systemic bank runs in times of financial distress

In times of financial distress, households and firms tend to convert their deposits into safe assets and cash. A CBDC, being a liability of the central bank, would have a higher degree of safety with respect to bank deposits.

# NiRvAna CBDC Blockchain proposal

Token-Based based on: **Account-Based** 

> **DLT**/Blockchain **DLT**/Blockchain

1) Federalist Digital Euro Federalist Digital Euro

> **ADF TDF**

- 2) **Proof of Authority PoA**
- **Private** 3)

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